An empirical study on the Chinese A-share: value stocks vs. growth stocks by Junxiao, Ding
 
 
A Work project presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Double Degree in 
Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics, and in Finance from the 

























A Project carried out on the Master in Double Degree Program, under the supervision of Prof. 
Martijn Boons from the NOVA School of Business and Economics as well as Prof. Sandra 













This paper compares the performance of value and growth strategy in the Chinese A-share 
markets in the post-reform period. The cumulative performance of annually rebalanced value and 
growth portfolio sorted by book-to-value ratio indicate that value strategy outperforms growth 
strategy over the time frame from January 2007 to October 2017. One can also observe a weak 
average value premium of 0.44% to 0.45% per month. However, the rolling window analysis 
indicates that the value premium in the A-share market is not robust over different time frames and 
investment horizons. As the time frame and investment duration vary, value strategy fails to 
outperform consistently. There no strong evidence to support a robust short-term or long-run 
advantage of value strategy. The weak and inconsistent value effect could be a result of the short 
horizon of the sample as there are only 129 months totally in the post-reform period. More 
importantly, the very strong speculative sentiment in the A-share markets is likely to be the cause 
for the weak value premium. Besides, another value metric, EBIT/Enterprise value, is compared 
with the book-to-market ratio. The results show that value portfolio sorted by book-to-market ratio 
has better performance than value portfolio sorted by EBIT/Enterprise value ratio. 
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1. Introduction  
As the second largest economy in the world, China plays an increasingly important role in the 
global financial market. The rapid development of Chinese corporations and the phenomenal 
growth of the stock market has also drawn substantial attention of domestic and foreign investors 
in recent years. Since the establishment of Shanghai stock exchange(hereinafter: SSE) and 
Shenzhen stock exchange(hereinafter: SZE) in the 1990s, the market capitalization of China’s stock 
market has skyrocketed since 2003. According to Iskyan (2016), as of 2016, China has surpassed 
Japan and Europe, thus took the second place in world’s largest stock market for a total market 
capitalization of US $6.6 trillion. That is a 1479 % increase in terms of total market capitalization 
since 2003. Compared to that of the U.S. counterpart, the total market capitalization has only grown 
87% in 13 years. The number of traded stocks increase rapidly from 13 in 1991 to 3491 in October 
2017. The Chinese RMB was also included as the fifth currency in Special Drawing Rights basket 
in 2016, which signals further integration of the Chinese financial system into the global market. 
The ups and downs of the domestic Chinese shares, mainly A-share, could lead to stock price 
fluctuations worldwide. In January 2016, the Chinese stock market dropped 18% within two weeks. 
It soon triggered a turbulence globally. The Dow Jones Industrial Average fell 8.2%. The DAX 
dropped below 10,000 in the same week.  
Nevertheless, despite  China’s prominent presence in the world financial market, the domestic 
stock market has long been criticized for being underregulated and very speculative. Like many 
emerging markets, the Chinese stock market is exposed to a series of problems such as strong 
government intervention, questionable accounting practice as well as underdeveloped security 
regulations. Moreover, given a large number of individual investors who are prone to profit from 
short-term capital gains, the Chinese market is extremely volatile and unpredictable. It is reported 
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that Chinese retail investors trade stocks almost four times more frequently than U.S. investors (G. 
Chen et al. 2007).  
In Berkshire Hathaway’s 2017 annual meeting, a Chinese value investor asked Warren 
Buffet’s opinion about the prospect of value investing in China. Buffet answered that value strategy 
would work as well in China eventually, despite the prevalence of the speculative trading. He 
added: 
When speculation gets rampant and when you’re getting what I guess Charlie (Munger) would 
call “social proof” that it’s worked recently, people can get very excited about speculating in 
markets. And, we will have it from time-to-time in the market….Markets have a casino 
characteristic that has a lot of appeal to people, particularly when they see people getting rich 
around them…. And those who haven’t been through cycles before are probably a little more 
prone to speculate than people who have experienced the outcome of wild speculations.…but 
it’s a dumb idea. And to the extent that you’re working on it, why you’re on the side of angels.  
Furthermore, literature about asset-pricing model and factor investing in Chinese A-share has been 
growing rapidly. Particularly, the Fama and French’s (1993) three-factor model has been 
empirically tested by many studies in the Chinese stock market. The existing literature shows that 
there exists a very strong size premium but results of the value premium are somehow divided. A 
recent research reconciles the finding of existing factor studies on Chinese A-share. They also carry 
out their own factor research and scrutinize 7 major factors in A-share from 1995 to 2016. The 
result suggests a strong value effect over the full sample but weakened value effect from 2008 to 
2016 (Hsu et al. 2017). Considering the promising prospect of value investing by Warren Buffet, 
as well as the significant value effect on the A-share market in the past literature, it would be 
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interesting to have a comprehensive view at how value strategy perform in the Chinese A-share 
market historically compared to the growth strategy.  
The reason I choose January 2007 as the starting date of the sample is that China’s financial 
system has been going through fundamental structural changes prior to 2007. 2007 represents the 
milestone of major transformations in the Chinese financial industry. The Chinese regulatory body, 
China Securities Regulatory Commission (hereinafter: CSRC), People’s Bank of China (the central 
bank), along with the ministry of finance had initiated several policy and regulation reforms from 
2002 to 2006, in order to develop a more efficient and liberal financial market as well as a more 
compliant and transparent corporate governance. The most prominent and influential changes are 
the split-share structure reform and the Chinese Accounting Standards (hereinafter: CAS) reform.  
The split-share structure1 reform was implemented since 2005. In order to transfer all the non-
tradable shares into tradable ones, most of the listed companies carried out the reforms with a 
compensation plan. It requires the non-tradable shareholders to compensate the tradable 
shareholder, for the reason that,  the reform benefits the non-tradable shareholders unilaterally. The 
value of previously non-tradable shares has increased after they are granted the option to be freely 
traded on the secondary market. Before the reform, the split-structure had been frequently criticized 
as constitutional barriers against the efficiency of the stock market. Li & Zhang (2011, 1061) states 
in their research, “it became an increasingly huge encumbrance upon further development of the 
Chinese stock market owing to its structural flaws. It substantially distorted the pricing mechanism 
in the stock market and added uncertainty to investors’ expectations…. As a result, prices and 
                                                 
1 The split-share structure separate A-shares into mainly two classes: tradable and non-tradable. Before the reform, 
two thirds of the outstanding A-shares were non-tradable shares, which belonged to the state, government entities 
and state-controlled financial institutions. It was established initially to ensure the central government control of 
state-owned enterprises (hereinafter: SOE). . 
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investor behavior did not reflect fundamental values of listed firms.” The split-structure reform had 
a huge impact on the market. By the end of 2006, the majority of the listed firms including all the 
SOEs had gone through the reform. Li and Zhang observe that after the reform, not only the value 
of  Shanghai stock composite index had increased substantially but also they find evidence of the 
weak-form efficiency of both Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market. Both markets were tested to 
be inefficient prior to the reform. 
Another important change is the convergence of the CAS towards International Financial 
Reporting Standards(hereinafter: IFRS).The previous CAS were inconsistent across different 
industries and were highly rule-based, which made it extremely difficult to rely on and compare 
between different companies. In Feb 2006, the Ministry of Finance introduced 39 new CAS, which 
to a great extent, are in line with IFRS. All public listed companies in China are required to follow 
the new accounting standards from January 2007.  Though not fully complying IFRS, the new CAS 
were permitted by European Commission in December 2008 for Chinese issuers in the European 
market up to three years. It has not only regulated and standardized the accounting practice of 
Chinese public companies but also been a remarkable milestone for the application of fundamental-
based trading strategy in China. Hence, It will be more representative of present market condition 
to choose the post-reform sample after 2007, due to the major accounting and security regulation 
changes mentioned above. Moreover, by excluding the samples before the reform, the fundamental 
ratios such as book-to-value and EV/EBIT are more consistent across time and comparable among 
different companies. 
Unlike the developed markets, technical trading and other short-term trading strategies still 
play a crucial role in deciding the prices of the Chinese A-share. However, with the effective 
regulatory changes and increasingly efficient market, I believe there should be a lot more potential 
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for fundamental based long-term trading strategy in the future. Even though the speculative retail 
investors still account for 90% of the A-share market. There’s a rapid growth of the institutional 
investors in recent years. Sun, Zheng, and Dong (2015, 106) claim that, in 2003, the private equity 
fund was supervised and recognized as institutional investors by CSRC. “The market value of their 
(institutional) shareholdings has boosted, from five funds of CNY4 billion (less than 1 percent of 
the whole market value in 1998) to 10 percent at a valuation of CNY2.25 trillion now.” Besides, 
according to official data from Shanghai Stock Exchange, the quota of the QFII program rose up 
to $93.99 billion as of August 30, 2017, which had tripled its amount since its first expansion in 
2007. The owners of QFII accounts are primarily foreign institutional investors who focus on long-
term gains rather than short-term speculation. The increase of domestic and foreign institutional 
investors will greatly promote the diversity of the investment structure, therefore contributing to 
the market efficiency and mitigating the “casino characteristic” of the Chinese stock market. 
Moreover, under President Xi’s administration, the anti-corruption campaign has been effectively 
increasing the corporate transparency and reducing accounting fraud and governmental control of 
listed companies including SOEs. Enforcement measures have been taken by CSRC to sanction 
auditors and auditing firms who fail to detect accounting fraud. In October 2013, a new policy was 
issued to prohibit government and party officials who are in the office from assuming directors of 
public listed companies. Retired officials must obtain authorities’ approval to work for listed 
companies and are banned to receive any payments from the companies. As a result, a number of 
government officials were forced to resign from their independent director positions. Hope, Yue, 
and Zhong (2017a, 2017b) study the effect of the policy on the transparency level and accounting 
quality of listed Chinese firms. They find that the financial transparency and accounting quality of 
firms with politically-connected directors increase after the enforcement of the policy. 
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This thesis focus on the performance of value strategy in the Chinese A-share market in the 
post-reform period from 2007 to 2017. It highlights the difference between the growth and value 
strategy. Based on the past factor studies on Chinese A-share, my study contributes to the existing 
literature in three aspects. Firstly, most factor studies about A-share market include the prior-
reform sample. My study focuses on the post-reform sample, which is more consistent and 
applicable to the current market condition. I also further extend the sample to October 2017, 
compared to the latest study by Hsu et al. (2017), who studies the post-reform sample from 2008 
to 2016. Secondly, I retrieve all the data from Bloomberg which is an alternative source, while 
most of past studies on Chinese A-share chose, the China Stock Market and Accounting Research 
(hereinafter: CSMAR) database, which is developed by a government-backed data company. 
Thirdly, I further compare the traditional value metric, book-to-market (hereinafter: B/M) ratio 
with another metric introduced by the magic formula, the EBIT/EV ratio, to see which metric yields 
the higher return. 
The remaining of the paper is constructed as follows. Section 2 outlines the background of the 
Chinese A-share market and its key characteristics. Section 3 summarizes the existing literature of 
factor studies in the A-share market. Section 4 describes the data and the empirical methodology. 




2. Overview of the Chinese stock market  
One critical challenge for scholars who study Chinese stock is that the PRC has a much 
shorter stock history compared with most of the developed markets. It was in 1984 that a company 
in Shanghai first publicly listed its shares in the PRC history. Apart from short historical samples, 
the poor legal infrastructure established in the 1990s and the piecemeal development of the 
regulatory framework result in a number of problems, such as accounting frauds, market 
manipulation, insider trading, frequent regulatory changes, strong government intervention as well 
as ambiguous shareholder rights. Additionally, as mentioned in the previous section, the reporting 
standards of companies before 2007 differ greatly from that of the post-reform ones. As a result, 
for studies who examine the full sample of Chinese A-share, the fundamental-based factors are 
inconsistent across the years and there is a limited number of listed stocks before 2000. All these 
problems give rise to the difficulty of factor study and undermine the significance level of the 
research.  
There is a list of noteworthy features that distinguish the Chinese stock market from the 
developed ones. They serve as essential grounds for explaining the difference of factor studies in 
China from the developed markets. 
Firstly, the Chinese stocks are structured in a more complex manner. It is segmented into 
three major categories: A-share, B-share, and H-share. A-share is renminbi-denominated shares 
which are listed in Mainland China. It is a class created initially for domestic investors and accounts 
for the majority of the market capitalization of all stocks listed in China. After the Qualified Foreign 
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Institutional Investors 2  (hereinafter: QFII) program was launched in 2002, it also becomes 
available for foreigners. B shares are U.S. or Hong Kong dollar-denominated shares. They are 
launched exclusively for foreigners or Chinese citizens with legal foreign currency account. But it 
represents only a small portion of the total market and is gradually phasing out due to the QFII 
program. H shares are stocks listed offshore in Hong Kong by a Chinese company for foreign 
investors. Similar shares classes are N-share and S-share which are listed in New York and 
Singapore respectively.  
Secondly, even though the non-tradable shares, which are previously held by the 
government,  has become tradable after the spit-structure reform, the government still holds a great 
amount of the ownership in the majority of the market capitalization. It not only reduces the amount 
of publicly investable securities but also strengthens the government’s role in corporate 
management. The split-share structure didn’t have a big impact upon the large-cap SOEs as the 
majority of the stocks are still held by the government and not traded in the market which makes 
the many large-cap stocks illiquid and less volatile to changes of market condition. 
Thirdly, CSRC frequently steps in and set trading rules to actively intervene the stock 
market. For example, in October 2015, a temporary short-selling ban was issued to stabilize the 
market. Other measures taken by CSRC includes forbidding large shareholders to sell their stocks 
in certain period time, adjusting transaction costs and etc. 
 Fourth, a great number of listed companies, especially SOEs suspend the trading in the 
exchange for a long period of time. For example, Xiamen Overseas Chinese Electronic Co 
suspended their trading for 8 months in January 2015 because of their restructuring process. It 
                                                 
2 the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors(hereinafter: QFII) was launched in November 2002 to allow foreign 
investors to purchase A-share. But not all stocks are available for QFII and the number of stocks allowed for QFII is 
limited.   
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suspended the trading again from August 2017 for the same reason. Shenzhen Special Economic 
Zone Real Estate & Properties Group Co Ltd halted the stock trading for almost one year in order 
to complete restructuring of important assets. These frequent trading suspensions hinder the 
liquidity of the stocks and give rises to the uncertainty of A-share market. There are mainly three 
reasons for the suspensions: (a) companies, particularly SOEs, suspend their trading in order to 
privately undergo projects or consolidation without disclosing to the public; (b) companies try to 
prevent further crash when its stock price plunges and the market is volatile. It is reported that in 
the 2015 stock meltdown, over half of the listed companies in both exchanges stopped trading. 
MSCI even set a 12-month removal rule exclusively to Chinese companies, in order to remove a 
number of long-suspended stocks from the index (Shen and Ruwitch 2017); (c) companies that are 
under financial distress and are designated with a “special treatment” status for 2 years are required 
to halt trading for one year and delisted in the third year if the company continue suffers losses. 
But the mechanism is rarely enforced. Ren (2017) reported that “Only 2 percent of mainland-listed 
companies reporting three consecutive years of losses have been delisted since Beijing established 
the stock market in 1990, compared with 5 to 6 percent in developed markets.” 
Fifth, almost 90% of the investor base in China are retail investors, who tend to speculate 
on short-term gains. Therefore, the market is very volatile and more likely to have behavioral 
biases. SSE and SZE even set 10% daily limit-up and limit-down mechanism of all listed stocks to 
curb the volatility.  
Sixth, the majority of the companies listed in the SSE and SZE either don’t pay or pay a 
very little amount of dividends. Returns of A-shares are mainly realized by capital gains rather than 
dividends. This might relate to the taxation on A-share investment. The capital gains of A-shares 
are not taxed but the dividends are. But it’s very likely that the Chinese companies will start issue 
10 
 
more and more dividends in the coming years, as reported by Bloomberg, the Chinese government 
has already been carrying out measures to encourage companies to pay more dividends in order to 
promote long-term holding (Horta E Costa 2017).  
 Lastly, short selling and marginal trading are not possible in China till 2010 and they were 
tested in a small scope at the very beginning. Though the ban was further lifted at the end of 2011, 
both practices are tightly constrained and limited to only 190 stocks and 7 exchange-traded funds. 
Chang, Luo, & Ren (2014) studied the impact of short selling and margin trading on the Chinese 
stock market after 2011. They find that intensified short-selling activities are associated with 
improved price efficiency and low return volatility.   
 All in all, despite deficiencies in the current Chinese A-share market, there’s noticeable trend 
of regulatory efforts towards a more efficient market. It is also expected to observe increasingly 
diversified investor structures and behaviors as well as more transparent corporate management in 






3. Literature review 
Eugene Fama and Ken French (1998) publish the article titled “Value Versus Growth: The 
International Evidence”, in which the two scholars examine 13 major developed markets around 
the world from 1975 to 1995. They find value stocks outperform growth stocks in 12 of the major 
markets but not China, as China just started the development of its stock market at the time when 
the article was published. But in recent years, the literature about Fama-French models and factor 
investing in the Chinese A-share market is also developing rapidly. However, the existing studies 
show inconsistent results. As one recent research on factor study states, “the emerging literature on 
Chinese equity anomalies has yielded troublesome disparities, particularly with respect to the 
magnitude and significance of the premium to a number of widely used factors, raising questions 
about the robustness of these results” (Hsu et al. 2017). 
Huang, and Yang (2010), in a study of all A shares listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen 
Exchange, find that “value premiums exist throughout the sample period of 1998 to 2008….both 
value and small stocks have persistent premiums over growth and big stocks.” They also come up 
with a metric to measure financial distress and find that there’s a low correlation between value 
premium and financial distress risk. Hsu et al. (2017) take almost the full historical sample of 
Chinese A-shares from 1995 to 2016 and compare factor strategy on Chinese A-share market to 
the U.S. counterpart. They observe similar results of strong value and size effect throughout the 
whole sample but much weaker and even negative value premium over shorter samples from 2008 
to 2016. Both studies use the China Stock Market and Accounting Research Database but define 
value strategy differently. Huang and Yang adopt the traditional definition and construct portfolio 
solely based on the book-to-market ratio, while Hsu et al. also employ book-to-price ratio, the 
earning-to-price ratio as well as the dividend-to-price ratio. Cheung, Hoguet, and Ng (2014, 58) 
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study Fama and French’s three-factor model on the constituents of the MSCI China A index from 
December 2001 to December 2013. They also find that “value, as measured by book equity over 
market equity, has a large and significant premium in the China A-shares market….The portfolios 
with the highest book-to-market ratios of each size tier do consistently have higher average returns 
than the portfolios with the lowest book-to-market ratios.” Xie and Qu (2016) find the significant 
size and value premium from A-shares listed on SSE between 2005 and 2012. Besides, they also 
examine the three factors across four different sectors. Their result shows that the value effect 
appears to be significant only in the utility sector.  
On the other hand, F. Wang & Xu (2004) draw a contradictory conclusion. They find that 
from July 1995 to June 2002, “the book-to-market variable is useless in explaining the cross-
sectional difference in equity returns. They attribute the surprising results to the evasive accounting 
standard and speculative market condition. C. Chen, Hu, Shao, & Wang, (2015) study the size and 
value effect of A share from July 1997 to December 2013.They find strong size effect but 
statistically insignificant value premium. They believe the insignificant value effect and the lack 
of robustness are caused by their selection of the sample. “The previously documented value effect 
is not robust and is largely caused by a few extreme months before 1997.” X. Chen, Kim, Yao, & 
Yu (2010) find weak outperformance of top book-to-market portfolio over the bottom one. “The 
top B/P-sorted portfolio outperforms the bottom B/P-sorted portfolio by 0.74% per month at the 
10 percent level.”  Y. Wang and Di Iorio (2007) get similar weak value effect from January 1994 
to December 2002. “On average, the return on the B/M top portfolio exceeds the return on the EWP 
benchmark and the B/M bottom portfolio by 0.493% and 0.861% per month respectively. ” 
B/M ratio is the most commonly used metric academically to separate value stocks from 
growth stocks quantitively. Fama and French (2011) explain the rationale of using book value on 
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their website forum. They believe that it wouldn’t make a big difference to use any fundamentals 
as the numerator. Book value is the better metric as it’s always positive and more stable over time. 
It will effectively reduce turnovers in forming value portfolio. Nevertheless, practitioners and 
academics are still searching for an alternative metric to further improve the performance of value 
portfolio. Other commonly used metrics include earning-to-market ratio, cashflow-to-market, 
dividend-to-market ratio. However, the problems with earning and cash flow are that they vary 
greatly and may have negative values, while the dividends are inappropriate to study A-share as 
the majority of the A-share companies don’t pay dividends.  Hsu et al. (2017) measure the value 
effect on A-share with several value factors including sale-to-market, earning-to-market, and 
dividend-to-market besides B/M. They find insignificant positive value premium with sale-to-
market sorts and negative insignificant value premium with the earning-to-market and dividend-
to-market sorts from 2008 to 2016. Another popular metric in the U.S. stock market is the 
EBIT/Enterprise ratio (hereinafter: EBIT/EV). It’s firstly introduced by Greenblatt (2006) along 
with the famous “magic formula”. He names the EBIT/EV ratio the “earnings yield”. Gary and 
Carlisle (2013) systematically examine the EBIT/EV ratio on the U.S. stock market from 1964 to 
2011. They find that earnings yield is the superior metric than B/M ratio in forming value portfolio. 
The earning yield sorted value portfolio not only has a higher return than B/M sorted value portfolio 
but also generate wider value spread. Their risk-adjusted analysis on both metrics also indicates 
that earning yield metric performs better. They believe that the EBIT/EV is better because it takes 
debt and preferred equity into consideration, which makes companies with different capital 
structures comparable. Walkshäusl and Lobe (2015) studies slightly different metric, the enterprise 
multiple (EBITDA/Enterprise value). They find strong evidence of EBITDA in deciding 
international returns. They also include 90 companies listed Shanghai, Shenzhen and Hong Kong 
in their sample. “The return predictability of EM(enterprise multiple) is similarly present in 
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developed markets and emerging markets and robust across small firms and large firms, after 
controlling for common benchmark variables like size, B/M value, and momentum. Furthermore, 
we confirm the existence of a sizeable EM value premium in international markets.”  
Other commonly studied factor based on Fama-French model on A-share includes size, 
momentum, reversal, volatility, profitability, and liquidity. Appendix 1 provides a comprehensive 
list of the existing literature about factor study on Chinese A share. As shown in the past literature, 
the Fama-French three-factor models are proven to be applicable to the Chinese market. Xu & 
Zhang (2014) suggests that the three-factor model explain 93% of the variation of A share return 
from 1996 to 2013.  Xie & Qu (2016) and Xinming Chen, Song, Gao, & Qiao (2017) also confirm 
the good explanation of return variation while utilizing the Fama-French three factors model. 
Among all the factors, size turns out to be the most agreed significant factor on A-share by the 
academics. Even though the existing literature studies the samples of different start/end date, the 
majority of factor studies on A-share confirm the robustness of the size factor. Though additional 
factors have been examined and tested in the asset pricing model in order to improve the 
explanatory power, the result is not robust. In some of the past literature, profitability, liquidity, 
and volatility may have added explanatory power to the model, but these factors are weak 
predictors and not robust across the sample and time horizon. Besides, technical indicators such as 
momentum is also a popular subject for academic research on Chinese A-share. Given a large 
number of retail investor and technical traders. Many investors believe that momentum indicators 
might work in the Chinese market, but the result is surprising. Y. Liu & Ping (2013) find a negative 
correlation between momentum factor and stock returns from 2000 to 2011. Hsu et al. (2017) 
confirm the finding on negative 12-month momentum factor. From 2008 to 2016, the momentum 
strategy spread is approximately negative 8%-12% per year.   
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4. Research Design and Methodology 
4.1 Research objective 
The past literature has provided extensive researches on asset-pricing models, especially 
Fama-French’s three-factor model, in the Chinese A-share market. Thus, the objective of this paper 
puts more emphasis on the performance of the value factor strategy rather than re-examining the 
asset-pricing models. I use the univariate sorting method based on B/M ratio to test the performance 
of value portfolio and growth portfolio from January 2007 to October 2017. Portfolios are further 
sorted based on the market capitalization to investigate the role of the size factor. Additionally, the 
alternative value metric, EBIT/EV, which is proven to work in the U.S. market, is also investigated 
to be compared with B/M ratio. 
4.2.Data  
Monthly stock prices, market capitalization, price-to-book (hereinafter: PB) ratios and 
EBIT/EV ratios are directly drawn from Bloomberg. In order to have a post-reform sample size as 
large as possible, I retrieved the above data from January 31, 2007, to the most recent date as of 
this study, which amounts to 129 months or 10.75 years. 
 As the monthly returns of A-shares are not available in Bloomberg, the monthly returns of 
stocks in this thesis are calculated by simply taking the difference of last prices in two adjacent 
months without taking into consideration of dividends. This is because the majority of Chinese-A 
shares pay no or very little amount of dividends to their shareholders from 2007 to 2017. For 
simplicity reasons, the returns in this thesis are all represented by capital gains.  
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The historical PB ratios are defined by Bloomberg as the last price divided by book value 
per share. The book value is retrieved from the latest financial report. The EBIT/ EV is defined as 
Enterprise value divided by adjusted3 trailing 12-month EBIT and the EBIT is defined as: 
EBIT= Market Capitalization + Preferred equity + Minority interest + Total debt – Cash & Equivalents 
All companies, which are listed in SSE and SZE as of October 2017, are selected to form portfolios. 
Stocks with missing market capitalization and unavailable PB or EBIT/EV ratios are removed from 
the investment universe. The investment universe includes companies from all industries including 
financial firms. Among the selected companies, manufacturing and IT companies account for the 
largest proportion, respectively 63% and 7% (See Figure 1). The issues related to survivorship bias 
is negligible in this study, as only 2% of the firms are delisted from the exchange since the 1990s 
(Ren 2017), and it’s difficult to trace delisted Chinese companies from the database. Therefore, 
companies which were delisted prior October 2017 are not included in the analysis. 
Figure 1. Companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen exchange by industry as of October 2017 
Source: Shanghai stock exchange, Shenzhen stock exchange 
                                                 











Industry Classification of Companies listed in SSE and SZE
Manufacturing IT Wholesale & Retail Real Estate






The univariate sorting method follows the literature of Fama and French’s (1998) three-
factor model. Book-to-market ratios of each stock are calculated as the inverse of PB ratios. Stocks 
are sorted annually in descending orders according to their B/M ratios as of January 31 each year. 
Decile portfolios are formed based on their B/M rankings and rebalanced annually. The problem 
of rebalancing the decile portfolio arises as the number of stocks listed in SSE and SZE has grown 
rapidly from 2007 to 2017. In 2007 there were only 1455 companies listed on the exchange but the 
number has reached 3303 in October 2017. As a result, the number of stocks which fit in the decile 
portfolio based on their B/M ranking in each year varies greatly. In order to address the problem, I 
take three methods to sort and select stocks. With the first method, I rank and extract the 1000 
stocks with the highest B/M ratios each year, thus stratify the stocks based on their B/M ranking 
and form decile portfolios of the same size. Therefore, each portfolio comprises 100 stocks 
throughout the investment horizon. The value portfolio is the one composed of 100 stocks with the 
highest B/M ratios and the growth portfolio the opposite. Since the fiscal year usually ends in 
December in China, each portfolio is rebalanced annually on Jan 31 from 2008 to 2017. Stocks 
which don’t fit in the corresponding decile at each rebalancing day will be sold and replaced with 
new stocks. This method ensures that each decile portfolio has the same number of stocks along 
the years but it makes the result susceptible to selection biases, because it excludes a number of 
growth stocks with the lowest B/M ratios, especially in the more recent sample. The second method 
follows the same process as the first one, except that I only choose the 1000 stocks with lowest 
B/M ratios on each rebalance date as the investment universe to form decile portfolios. As a result, 
an increasing number of value stocks with highest B/M ratios are excluded from forming the decile 
portfolios in the more recent years. The third method ranks and includes all the stocks listed on 
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both exchanges to form the decile portfolio. However, on each rebalance date, the decile portfolio 
has a different number of stocks in forming the portfolio, which might lead to biased risk-adjusted 
analysis across the investment horizon. I name the first method, B/M1, the second, B/M2 and the 
third, B/M3. The analysis built on the EBIT/EV ratio follows the same methodology as that of the 
B/M ratio. Similarly, EBIT/EV1, EBIT/EV2, EBIT/EV3 are called to differentiate the three 
methods. The decile portfolio with the highest EBIT/EV ratio is the value portfolio and the one 
with lowest EBIT/EV ratio is the growth portfolio. 
To have a statistical overview of the sample’s B/M and EBIT/EV ratio, I summarize the 
ratios of around 3000 A-share stocks on January 31, 2017, and their distributions are shown in  
Figure 2. As one can see, the distribution of both B/M and EBIT/EV ratios are positively skewed, 
which implies the whole market is tilting to the overvalued side. The average value of B/M ratios 
is around 0.31 and the average value of EBIT/EV ratios is 2.53. In other words, the market pays 
more than 3 times of the stocks’ book value on average in the A-share market. Figure 2 also 
illustrates how each method selects the stocks to form decile portfolios. As the number of listed 
stocks increases to more than 3000 in 2017, the decile portfolios formed by B/M1 and B/M2 
include totally different stocks. The drawbacks of the two methods also become more and more 
pronounced. The stocks included in the top B/M2 sorted portfolio is not very representative of the 
value strategy and the stocks included in the bottom B/M1 sorted portfolio are also not 
representative of the growth strategy. Therefore, in the following analysis, the B/M1 top sorted 
portfolio is compared with the B/M2 bottom sorted portfolio and B/M3 top sorted portfolio is 
compared with B/3 bottom sorted portfolio. The summary statistics of B/M ratio, EBIT/EV ratio 




Figure 2. Histogram of book-to-market ratios and EBIT/EV ratios from all sampled stocks on January 31 2017. 












































Another major problem with the calculation of portfolio returns is that a great number of 
last prices are missing due to the frequent trading suspensions. Therefore, stocks that are suspended 
on rebalancing dates are not included in the portfolios. In addition, if certain stock is suspended in 
the exchange after the rebalancing date, its price during the suspension period will be regarded as 
unchanged and therefore have no return until it’s replaced at the next rebalancing date. As shown 
in Figure 3, the number of suspended stocks increase sharply in the past 3 years and drop again 
recently.  During the Chinese market meltdown in 2016, more than 200 companies suspended their 
listings on the exchange. The frequent and long-term suspension issues are related to the 
problematic suspension regulations on both exchanges. As listed companies can voluntarily halt 
trading, they would suspend the trading when the market get bear and volatile to prevent further 
price crash. 
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4.4.Descriptive statistics of the benchmark   
The existing relevant index covering top stocks in SSE and SZE is the CSI 300. It is a 
capitalization-weighted stock market index of the top 300 stocks listed in both exchanges, which 
is a good benchmark to track the market but not that comparable to our trading strategy due to 
different weighting methods. In order to compare the performance of the portfolios, I construct 
three equally weighted indices: 1) EWCB by big-cap companies (top 30% market capitalization). 
2) EWCM by mid-cap companies (middle 40% market capitalization) and 3) EWCS by small-cap 
companies (bottom 30% market capitalization).The indices are rebalanced on Jan 31 each year 
according to their market capitalization. Figure 4 shows the benchmark values as a base of 100 
calculated from January 2007 to October 2017. 
Figure 4. Value of EWCB, EWCS, and EWCM from January 2007 to October 2017 
EWCB is composed of top 30% A share companies by market capitalization 
EWCM is composed of middle 40% A share companies by market capitalization 
EWCS is composed of bottom 30% A share companies by market capitalization 
 
Two stock crashes could be clearly observed from the chart. One occurred in 2008 during the 
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one is the market meltdown from 2015 to 2016, which had a huge impact on the global financial 
market. 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics of average monthly returns of EWCB, EWCM and EWCS index from February 2007 to 
October 2017   
 
EWCB EWCM EWCS 
Mean 1.17% 1.79% 2.66% 
Median 1.68% 1.89% 3.05% 
Min -27.27% -28.33% -27.64% 
Max 30.79% 34.02% 33.85% 
Standard Deviation 9.60% 10.73% 11.01% 
 
As shown in Table 1,  a strong size effect can be clearly observed in the A-share market. 
The result is consistent with the past literature. The average monthly return of EWCS and EWCM 
is respectively 2.66% and 1.79%, while the average monthly return of EWCB is only 1.17%. That 
is to say, the small-to-medium-cap companies in China generate much better performance than the 
big-cap companies each month on average from 2007 to 2017.  
The very robust size factor in the Chinese stock market is not only a result of inherent higher 
business risk related to small-cap companies but also due to the disparities between SOEs and non-
SOEs. A great number of large-cap companies in China are SOEs. Even though the split-structure 
has made the non-tradable shares public in these SOEs, the majority of the market capitalization is 
still controlled by the government, which makes these stocks illiquid and less volatile. As a result, 
the returns of large-cap companies have a much lower return. The difference between EWCB and 
EWCS is especially pronounced when Chinese stock market started to boom since 2013. 
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5. Empirical results 
To compare different portfolios, I evaluate the performances in five measures: 1) 
cumulative value (hereinafter: CV), 2)10.75-year annualized return (hereinafter: AZR), 3) year-by-
year annual return(hereinafter: AR), 4) annualized returns over rolling period of 1year, 3 years, 5 
years and 8 years(hereinafter: RAR_1,RAR_3,RAR_5,RAR_8) and 5) average monthly return.  
The formulas of the calculation are listed as follows: 
 1) 
𝐶𝑉𝑡 = 𝐶𝑉0 ∗ (1 + 𝑅1)(1 + 𝑅2) … . (1 + 𝑅𝑡) 
 
CV0 =100 on January 31, 2007; 




















































































There are totally 30 decile portfolios formed with the three methods illustrated in the 
methodology. The performances of value and growth portfolios constructed by each method are all 
presented in the figures and charts in this section, but I primarily look at the performance of 4 
portfolios for comparison: B/M1_value, B/M2_growth, B/M3_value, B/M3_growth.  
 a) B/M1_value is the portfolio consisting of 100 stocks with highest B/M ratios every year. 
 b) B/M2_growth is the portfolio consisting of 100 stocks with lowest B/M ratios every year. 
 c) B/M3_value is the portfolio consisting of top 10% stocks with highest B/M ratios every year. 
 d) B/M3_growth is the portfolio consisting of the bottom 10% stocks with the lowest B/M ratios 
every year. 
The value premium measures the difference between the performance of value portfolio and growth 
portfolio. In the following analysis, two measures of value premiums, VPa and VPb, are examined 
and they are defined as below: 
VPa= B/M1_value –B/M2_growth 
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Additionally, it’s important to note that the decile portfolios created by B/M3 have increasing 
numbers of stocks after each rebalancing dates as shown in Figure 5 due to increasing number of 
new companies listed in the exchanges. The B/M1 and B/M2 keep the number of stocks in the 
portfolio constant but have to exclude more and more stocks in the later dates. 
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5.1. Growth stocks vs. Value stocks  
Figure 6 presents the cumulative value of value and grow portfolios constructed by each 
method as well as two benchmarks, EWCB and EWCS, assuming 100 RMB is invested on January 
31, 2007. All portfolios are equally weighted and rebalanced annually. The results suggest that the 
value strategy outperforms the growth strategy over the period from January 2007 to October 2017 
if we solely consider the cumulative performance over 10.75 years. 
Figure 6. Cumulative performance comparison chart of value and growth portfolio with a base value of 100 ( Jan 
2017 to October 2017) 
B/M1sorting create value and growth portfolios from the 1000 companies with the highest B/M ratios  
B/M2 sorting create value and growth portfolios from the 1000 companies with the lowest B/M ratios  
B/M3 sorting create value and growth portfolios from the all listed companies 
All portfolios are equally weighted and rebalanced annually   
 
The value portfolio consisting of the 100 stocks with the highest B/M value (B/M1_value) turns 
100 RMB invested on Jan 30, 2007, to 772.9 RMB on October 30, 2017, which represents an 
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B/M sorted Portfolio Value of 100 RMB invested (Value vs. Growth) 
B/M1_Value B/M2_Value B/M3_Value B/M1_Growth
B/M2_Growth B/M3_Growth EWCB EWCS
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values (B/M2_growth) turns 100 RMB invested on Jan 30, 2017, to 437.9 RMB on October 30, 
2017, which is equivalent to an annualized return of 14,73%. The difference between the 
cumulative values of the two portfolios translates to a value premium of 335 RMB, which is more 
than 3 times of the initial investment. Comparing the value portfolio consisting of the top 10% 
stocks with the highest B/M value (B/M3_value) and the growth portfolio formed by the bottom 
10% stocks with the lowest B/M values (B/M3_growth), I get the similar results. The difference 
between B/M3_value and B/M3_growth translates to a value premium of 309 RMB. 
The cumulative performance of all growth and value portfolios lie between EWCS and 
EWCB. It’s important to note that size plays an important role in deciding the returns of Chinese 
A-share. From 2013 to 2015, the Chinese stock market had an unprecedented boom. The bull 
market lasts for 2 years until the bubble bursts in 2015. The stock prices of a group of small-cap 
companies have been growing remarkably under the bull market condition. As one can see from 
the cumulative values of EWCS, the benchmark formed by small-cap companies had a tremendous 
growth from 2013 to 2015 and still gain strong momentum after the market meltdown in 2016. On 
the other hand, the growth of large-cap companies at the same time are much weaker. The EWCB 
only shows slight fluctuation while the market gets extremely volatile. As discussed earlier, this is 
due to the illiquidity of large-cap stocks in the Chinese stock market. Figure 7 depicts the 
annualized returns of all decile portfolios over the period from January 30, 2007, to October 30, 
2017. Portfolios with a lower ranking are composed of stocks with higher B/M ratios while 
portfolios with a higher ranking are composed of stocks with lower B/M ratios. The result indicates 
slight downwards trend as the portfolio moves to the growth side. Besides, as a result of the very 
strong and persistent size factor, the returns of all portfolio fall below the EWCS index but beat the 
EWCB index. Compared with the EWCM index, B/M1_value, B/M2_value, and B/M3_value all 
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beat the market, but not B/M2_growth and B/M3_growth. I use the EWCM index as the main 
benchmark for the following analysis as its returns provide a better balance between stocks of large-
cap SOEs companies and small-cap non-SOEs and are at a more comparative level with the 
portfolio returns.  
Figure 7. 10.75-year annualized return for decile portfolios( January 2007 to October 2017) 
 
The returns in Table 2 reflect the year-by-year annual performance of value and growth 
portfolios with the three methods from 2007 to 2017 as well as the annualized value premiums if 
portfolios are invested on January 31 of each year. Even though, as one could see from the results 
of VPa and VPb, in 3 to 4 years out of the 10.75 years, value fails to outplay growth, the value 
portfolio still keep a better record when the performances are solely evaluated on a year-by-year 
basis. Within the 10.75 years, the B/M1_value beats the market 7 times while the B/M2 growth 
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Table 2.Year-by-year annual returns of value and growth portfolios as well as the value premiums. (2007 to 2017) 
Annual returns are calculated as if portfolios are invested on January 31 of the year and sold on January 31 of the next 
year except for the return in 2017. Return in 2017 is annualized from the 9-month return from January 31 to October 
31.Shaded cells are marked to indicate the outperformance over EWCM. 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
B/M1_Value 169% -56% 132% 7% -23% 11% -6% 93% 34% 29% 11% 
B/M2_Value 147% -54% 122% 22% -29% 5% 21% 41% 74% 27% -11% 
B/M3_Value 166% -56% 130% 6% -23% 9% 4% 78% 40% 26% 6% 
B/M1_Growth 127% -52% 114% 18% -29% 0% 15% 39% 73% 26% -2% 
B/M2_Growth 119% -57% 98% 16% -24% 9% 8% 31% 97% 22% -20% 
B/M3_Growth 114% -57% 96% 22% -25% 10% 17% 23% 89% 17% -17% 
EWCB 129% -59% 88% 7% -27% 1% 3% 38% 31% 14% 5% 
EWCM 134% -55% 113% 17% -28% 2% 17% 35% 67% 21% -8% 
EWCS 151% -49% 133% 25% -24% 8% 30% 45% 97% 41% -1% 
VPa 51% 1% 35% -8% 0% 2% -14% 62% -64% 7% 31% 
VPb 52% 1% 34% -17% 3% -1% -13% 54% -49% 10% 23% 
 
In order to check whether the long-run advantage of value portfolios is robust across 
different time frames and duration, I also examine rolling-window returns at an interval of 1, 3, 5 
and 8 years. The rolling-window returns at smaller time frames also provide more realistic results 
for investors as a reference, since most investors won’t invest in a single trading strategy for more 
than 10 years or within the specific period as defined in the above returns. Table 3 shows the 
annualized returns of B/M1_value, B/M3_value, B/M2_growth and B/M3_growth  portfolios with 
a rolling window of 8 years. As shown in the table, the values of VPa and VPb are negative from 
October 2007 to December 2008, which means, if the investors get into the market during this 
period and invest on both growth and value portfolios for 8 years, the value portfolio would actually 
underperform the growth portfolio. Hence, despite the fact that value does show much better 
cumulative performance than growth over the whole investment horizon as shown in Figure 6, 
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there is no statistical evidence to prove that the value strategy would outperform growth strategy 
in the A-share market consistently, even if investors invest in it in the long term. 
Table 3. Annualized rolling returns (RAR_8) of BM1_value, B/M3_Value, B/M2_Growth with a rolling window of 8 
years from January 2007 to October 2017  
Period B/M1_Value B/M3_Value B/M2_Growth B/M3_Growth VPa VPb 
01.2007 - 01.2015 22% 22% 15% 16% 6.86% 6.42% 
02.2007 - 02.2015 19% 19% 15% 15% 4.26% 3.86% 
03.2007 - 03.2015 19% 19% 16% 17% 2.44% 2.66% 
04.2007 - 04.2015 17% 17% 16% 16% 0.34% 0.77% 
05.2007- 05.2015 17% 17% 18% 18% -1.17% -0.80% 
06.2007- 06.2015 20% 20% 17% 17% 2.75% 3.23% 
07.2007 - 07.2015 13% 14% 12% 13% 0.95% 1.34% 
08.2007 - 08.2015 10% 11% 9% 9% 1.30% 1.91% 
09.2007 - 09.2015 9% 9% 8% 9% 0.11% 0.26% 
10.2007 - 10.2015 12% 12% 12% 13% -0.80% -0.41% 
11.2007 -11.2015 13% 14% 15% 15% -2.17% -1.55% 
12.2007 -11.2015 12% 13% 14% 14% -1.90% -1.23% 
01.2008 - 01.2016 10% 10% 10% 10% -0.60% -0.43% 
02.2008 - 02.2016 9% 9% 9% 9% -0.58% -0.08% 
03.2008 - 03.2016 13% 13% 15% 15% -2.33% -1.58% 
04.2008 - 04.2016 13% 14% 16% 15% -2.67% -1.48% 
05.2008- 05.2016 13% 14% 15% 15% -2.19% -1.53% 
06.2008- 06.2016 17% 18% 19% 20% -2.17% -2.11% 
07.2008 - 07.2016 17% 17% 18% 18% -0.88% -0.70% 
08.2008 - 08.2016 21% 21% 23% 23% -1.51% -1.31% 
09.2008 - 09.2016 23% 23% 25% 24% -2.00% -1.37% 
10.2008 - 10.2016 28% 28% 30% 30% -2.11% -1.81% 
11.2008 -11.2016 26% 26% 27% 27% -1.46% -1.42% 
12.2008 -11.2016 25% 25% 25% 25% -0.25% 0.29% 
01.2009 - 01.2017 24% 24% 23% 22% 1.11% 1.52% 
02.2009 - 02.2017 23% 23% 22% 21% 1.69% 1.51% 
03.2009 - 03.2017 20% 20% 18% 18% 2.52% 1.87% 
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04.2009 - 04.2017 20% 19% 17% 16% 2.94% 2.59% 
05.2009- 05.2017 18% 17% 14% 14% 3.29% 2.57% 
06.2009- 06.2017 17% 16% 14% 13% 3.02% 2.28% 
07.2009 - 07.2017 15% 14% 12% 11% 3.36% 2.87% 
08.2009 - 08.2017 18% 17% 14% 14% 4.07% 3.42% 
09.2009 - 09.2017 17% 17% 14% 14% 3.53% 3.02% 
10.2009 - 10.2017 16% 15% 12% 12% 3.52% 2.81% 
 
The inconsistent long-run performance of value portfolio can be further confirmed by 
rolling-window returns of shorter durations as indicated in table 4. Table 4 summarizes the 
frequency of value portfolio’s outperformance over growth with a rolling window size of one year, 
three years, five years and eight years respectively. The frequency is based on the comparison of 
annualized return between BM1_value and BM2_growth as well as the comparison of annualized 
return between BM3_value and BM3_growth.As one can infer from the Table 4, no matter how 
long an investor would stick to the value strategy during the period from January 2007 to October 
2017, there’s almost 50% probability that value strategy would lose to growth strategy. The 
frequency of value outperforming doesn’t necessarily increase as the length of investment period 
increases. 
Table 4.Frequency of value’s outperforming over growth in rolling periods of one, three, five  and eight years (January 
2007 to October 2017) 
 BM1_Value > BM2_Growth BM3_Value > BM3_Growth 
118 one-year rolling window 56.8% 60.2% 
94 three-year rolling window 45.74% 53.19% 
70 five-year rolling window 54.29% 47.14% 




As there’s no strong evidence to support the robustness of the value effect in the long -run, 
it would be interesting to have a look at the short-term performances of both strategies.  




Table 5 demonstrates the descriptive statistics of monthly returns of value and growth portfolios as 
well as the monthly value premiums. Both measures of value premium(VPa and VPb) indicate that, 
at a monthly average level, there exists a weak value premium around 0.44% to 0.45%, which 
translate to an annualized return of 5.41% to 5.54%. My result is quite close to the findings by X. 
Chen, Kim, Yao, & Yu (2010) whereas they study the Chinese A-share from 1995 to 2007. Their 
result shows that value outperforms the growth slightly around 0.7% per month on average. 
Additionally, compared with EWCM, value portfolios formed by all three methods(B/M1_value, 
B/M2_value, B/M3_value) show higher monthly average return than the market while the growth 
portfolios formed by B/M2 and B/M3 shows slightly lower return. Nevertheless, the monthly 
outperformance is not consistent.  In about half out of the 129 months along the whole investment 
horizon does the value portfolio fail to outplay the growth portfolio with all three methods. 





B/M1_Value 2.12% 10.26% 1.58 0.21 41.92% -25.65% 54.3% 49.6% 
B/M2_Value 2.10% 11.29% 0.72 -0.01 37.75% -31.78% 55.8% 55.0% 
B/M3_Value 2.08% 10.34% 1.40 0.12 41.23% -24.93% 51.9% 52.7% 
B/M1_Growth 1.89% 10.26% 0.42 -0.21 28.83% -27.33% 55.8%  
B/M2_Growth 1.67% 10.10% 0.37 -0.22 22.97% -25.37% 50.4%  
B/M3_Growth 1.64% 10.14% 0.50 -0.26 27.16% -26.83% 51.2%  
EWCM 1.79% 10.64% 0.64 -0.09 34.02% -28.33%   
VPa 0.45% 5.63% 5.03 0.99 28.46% -14.34%   
VPb 0.44% 5.36% 3.9 0.74 24.5% -15.09%   
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Moreover, neither the value portfolio nor the growth one has a consistent beat-the-market record. 
Out of the 129 months, the BM3_value portfolio beats the market 67 times while the BM3_ growth 
portfolio beats the market 66 times. The value portfolio doesn’t really demonstrate a significantly 
higher beat-the-market record than the growth portfolio. 
Figure 8 presents the value premiums for each month from January 2007 to 2017. Bars at 
the right side of the axis are months in which value outperforms and the magnitude represents the 
strength of the value premium while the bars which fall at the left side of the axis are months with 
non-existent value premium. Like the long-run performance of value portfolios, there’s no robust 
evidence to prove the consistent existence of monthly value premium. The fail-to-outperform 
months scatter across the investment horizon dispersedly and doesn’t seem to be concentrated in 
the specific time frame. Though it seems to be no obvious pattern of the value premium in different 
market cycles, one could conjecture that the disruptive force of speculative investors could be the 
reason of weak value premium in the A-share market from the observation of highly volatile 
periods. As mentioned above, the sample time horizon I choose witnesses the burst of two market 
bubbles. One occurred in 2007 and the other from 2015 to 2016. In both cases, the price of the 
stocks increased rapidly and suddenly dropped more than 50% within months. It happens that the 
strongest monthly value premium occurs in these two periods, as indicated in the green areas in 
Figure 8, but the strong value outperformance is very soon offset by the extreme 
underperformances. As the market gets speculative, short-term investors trade frequently 
regardless the book value of the company. No fundamental-based trading strategy and factor is 
robust during these periods. As a result, the value of value premium swings greatly between 




Figure 8. Value  premium calculated from the difference of monthly returns between B/M1_Value and B/M2_Growth (VPa), and 
the difference between B/M3_Value and B/M3_Growth (VPb) (February 2007 to October 2017) 
 
 






































All in all, after examining the performance of value and growth portfolios sorted by B/M 
ratios from January 2007 to October 2017, solely based on the cumulative performances across the 
whole sample time horizon and the average monthly returns of each strategy, value portfolio does 
outperform growth portfolio. however, if we look at rolling returns at different window size and 
time frame, there’s no strong evidence to prove that value portfolio beats the growth portfolio 
consistently. Even if investors invest in value portfolio for a longer duration up to 8 years, the value 
premium is still not robust.  My result coincides with the research by Hsu et al. (2017). They find 
the significant value-weighted return of high-minus-low portfolio from 1996 to 2016 but the result 
of value premium from 2008 to 2016 is also quite weak. Over the shorter sample, they attribute the 
diminishing value effect to A-share’s sensitivity to the global financial crisis in 2008 and the 




5.2. Comparison with the US market  
To compare the value premium of US market during the same time horizon, I retrieved the 
historical monthly returns of equally weighted U.S. “low 10” and “high 10”4  portfolios from the 
Fama/French research website. The low 10 and high 10 portfolio stand for the growth and value 
strategy in the U.S. market.   
Figure 9 Comparison between the cumulative performance of portfolios in the U.S. and the Chinese market  
The cumulative values of value and growth portfolios in the U.S. market are presented as orange and blue lines and in 
accordance to the y-axis at the right side. 
The cumulative values of value and growth portfolios in the Chinese market are presented as grey and yellow stacked 
areas and in accordance with the y-axis at the left side. 
  
                                                 
4 “low 10” and “high 10” are defined as univariate B/M ratio sorted decile portfolio by Fama/French research. “low 
10” are growth portfolios composed of stocks with the bottom 10% B/M ratios and “high 10” are value portfolio 
composed of stocks with the top 10% B/M ratios. The returns of portfolios are also capital gains without taking 


















Cumulative performance of value and growth portfolio in the U.S. and 
Chinese A-shares market
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As mentioned in the beginning of the paper, the Chinese A-shares market is quite different 
from the U.S. counterpart in many ways. Particularly, it’s much younger, less efficient and has 
unique investor structure. The solid lines in Figure 9 depict the cumulative performance of the 
growth and value strategy in the U.S. market from January 2007 to October 2017. Compared with 
the cumulative performance in the Chinese market (the stacked areas), the U.S. value and growth 
portfolio seems to have a much weaker but more stable growth after the financial crisis in 2008, 
which could be confirmed by the descriptive statistics of their monthly returns shown in Table 6. 
The average monthly return of both growth and value portfolios in the Chinese market is more than 
2 times of that in the U.S. market but demonstrates higher standard deviation. Nevertheless, based 
on the cumulative performances and average monthly returns of value and growth portfolios in the 
U.S. and Chinese market from February 2007 to October 2017, value does outperform growth in 
both markets. The U.S. market shows an average monthly value premium of 0.21% while the 
Chinese market shows an average monthly value premium of 0.44% to 0.45%. 
Table 6. Descriptive statistics of monthly return of value and growth portfolios in the U.S and Chinese market. 
 
 
Mean Standard Deviation Kurtosis Skewness Max Min 
BM1_Value 2.12% 10.30% 1.58 0.21 41.92% -25.65% 
BM3_Value 2.08% 10.38% 1.40 0.12 41.23% -24.93% 
U.S._Value 0.73% 6.97% 3.51 0.06 30.54% -25.69% 
BM2_Growth 1.67% 10.14% 0.37 -0.22 22.97% -25.37% 
BM3_Growth 1.64% 10.18% 0.50 -0.26 27.16% -26.83% 
U.S. Growth 0.53% 6.04% 1.95 -0.42 20.52% -23.12% 
VPa 0.45% 5.66% 5.03 0.99 28.46% -14.34% 
VPb 0.44% 5.38% 3.90 0.74 24.50% -15.09% 
VP_U.S. 0.21% 3.52% 0.97 0.65 11.82% -7.49% 
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I conduct the same rolling-window analysis to test the robustness of value premium in the 
U.S. market. The results are shown in Table 7. Different from the Chinese market, the U.S. market 
exhibits very strong long-run advantages of the value strategy. As the investment horizon increases, 
the probability of the value outperformance is improved greatly. With a five-year investment 
horizon, the frequency of the value portfolio outperforming growth portfolio reaches almost 93%. 
With an eight-year investment horizon, the value investors are guaranteed an outperformance than 
the growth investors whenever they enter the market within the time frame from January 2007 to 
October 2009.  
Table 7.Frequency of value’s outperforming over growth in rolling periods of one, three, five  and eight years (Jan 
2007 to Oct 2017) 
  
 US_Value  >  US_Growth 
129 monthly returns 43.41% 
118 one-year rolling window 53.39% 
94 three-year rolling window 84.04% 
70 five-year rolling window 92.86% 
34 eight-year rolling window 100% 
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5.3. Risk measure and risk-adjusted performance 
Several common risk measures, as well as risk-adjusted return metrics, are examined in this 
section: standard deviation, downside deviation, beta, value at risk (hereinafter: VaR), sharp ratio, 
Sortino ratio, and alpha. Each metric gauges different aspects of the portfolio’s riskiness. All risk 
measures are carried upon the monthly returns from February 2007 to October 2017.  
Standard deviations and downside deviations are absolute volatility measures. Beta 
measures the relative volatility over the market return. Value at risk models the maximum potential 
loss in the worst case scenario at a specific confidence level. Sharp ratio and Sortino ratio are risk-
adjusted measures,  estimating the excess return for each additional unit of volatility. Sharp ratio 
and standard deviation take both upside and downside risk into consideration, while the downside 
deviation and Sortino ratio only account for downside risk, which is more relevant for risk 
evaluation for portfolio performance. Alpha captures the excess return of a portfolio over the 
required return determined by the market. Both alpha and beta are estimated from the capital asset 
pricing model(CAPM). I use the 1-year standard bank deposit rate as the risk-free rate and EWCM 
as the market return for Chinese A-shares market, and “RF” and “Mkt” data from Fama/French as 
the risk-free rate and market return for the U.S. market, and 0 as the minimum acceptable rate. All 
risk measures are based on historical monthly returns. 
As shown in Table 8, comparing the standard deviation and the downside deviation of 
growth and value portfolios in the Chinese A-share markets, the difference between the two is 
minimal. The results of beta estimate also indicate comparable relative risk between the two 
portfolios. The alpha estimates seem to imply higher abnormal return generated by value strategy 
but none of the alpha measurement are significant statistically. Nevertheless, the results of other 
risk metrics show that the value portfolio generates better risk-adjusted performance and is less 
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risky than the growth portfolio. Both Sortino ratio and the Sharp ratio of the value portfolio shows 
higher result than the growth one. The Sharp ratio of BM1 sorted value portfolio is 0.18, while that 
of BM2_growth is 0,14. The Sortino ratio of BM3_value value portfolio is 0.27, while that of 
growth portfolio is 0.20. Another risk metric I use to compare the performance is the VaR.  
Table 8.  Risk measurement and risk-adjusted ratios of value and growth portfolio  (January 2007 to October 2017) 
*** p <.001 
As the result illustrates, the one-month 1% VaR of value and growth portfolio doesn’t differ 
greatly, but growth portfolio demonstrates slightly poorer results in the worst-case scenario. At 
99% confidence level, the maximum loss of the BM1_value portfolio will not exceed -22.13%, 
while the maximum loss of B/M2_Growth portfolio will not exceed -24.67%. It seems that in the 
Chinese A-share market, at a monthly average level, the value portfolio not only have higher 
returns but also shows lower risk than the growth portfolio. Reverting to the U.S. market, I find 
that the value portfolio indicates better risk-adjusted returns but worse VaR than growth portfolio, 
which is consistent with the classical modern finance doctrine that higher returns are compensated 













BM1_Value 10.34% 6.67% 0.87*** 0.18 0.28 -22.13% 0.53% 
BM2_Value 11.38% 7.03% 1.05*** 0.16 0.27 -25.56% 0.22% 
BM3_Value 10.42% 6.85% 0.91*** 0.18 0.27 -22.72% 0.43% 
BM1_Growth 10.34% 6.75% 0.95*** 0.16 0.25 -24.55% 0.17% 
BM2_Growth 10.17% 6.76% 0.92*** 0.14 0.21 -24.67% 0.01% 
BM3_Growth 10.22% 6.82% 0.92*** 0.l4 0.20 -25.64% -0.03% 
U.S._Growth 6.06% 4.53% 1.26*** 0.05 0.10 -14.16% -0.4% 
U.S._Value 7.00% 5.05% 1.30*** 0.07 0.13 -17.89% -0.2% 
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value shows lower risk and higher returns. Huang and Yang (2010) draw a similar conclusion. 
From the sample of A-shares from 1998 to 2008,  they find that “value stocks are less risky than 




5.4. Value premium in big and small stocks 
The previous analysis of value and growth strategies are based on the performances of 
univariate sorted portfolios. In this section, I sub-sort the B/M1 and B/M2 sorted portfolios 
according to the market capitalization, creating 30 bivariate sorted portfolios with each method.  
Table 9. Average monthly returns of bivariate sorted value and growth portfolios  
 
Each B/M sorted decile portfolio is subdivided into 3 sub-portfolios: small-cap, mid-cap and big-
cap. Each B/M1 and B/M2 sorted decile portfolios comprises 100 stocks. Thus, the small-cap sub-
portfolio consist of 30 stocks with the lowest market capitalization and the big-cap consist of 30 
stocks with the highest market capitalization. The mid-cap sub-portfolio consist of the middle 40 
stocks. The results are illustrated in Table 9, Figure 10 and 11.  Figure 10 and 11 sets out the 
average monthly returns of all 30 sub-portfolios with B/M1 and B/M2 sorts. We can clearly see the 
presence of size premium in the A-shares market but not so much for the value premium. As the 
portfolios move to the value sides, there’s no significant improvement of monthly return for 
portfolios with all three level of market capitalization. Table 10 summarizes the average monthly 
returns of each sub-portfolios generated from the value and growth strategy. As one can see, value 
premium does exsit in all small, mid and big companies but is quite weak. The VPa of big-cap and 
medium-cap amounts to 0.65% and 0.45% while VPa of small-cap is only about 0.12%. It seems 
 
Big-Cap Medium-Cap Small-Cap 
B/M1_Value 1.42% 2.01% 2.96% 
B/M1_Growth 1.27% 1.66% 2.82% 
B/M2_Value 1.16% 2.15% 2.76% 
B/M2_Growth 0.77% 1.57% 2.84% 
VPa 0.65% 0.45% 0.12% 
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that as the size increases, the wider the value premium is. But whether the result is robust across 
different samples and time horizon needs further exploration and is beyond the topic of this paper. 
Figure 10.  Average monthly returns of decile portfolios sorted by B/M1 and size  
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5.5. B/M vs. EBIT/EV  
In order to compare B/M and EBIT/EV and see which value metric generate a value 
portfolio with a higher return, I first examine cumulative performances of value portfolio sorted by 
these two metrics. From Figure 12, the cumulative performance of all value portfolios indicates 
that B/M is the superior metric in selecting value stocks as value portfolios sorted by B/M generates 
higher cumulative returns with all three methods.The same conclusion can be drawn by comparing 
the average monthly return of B/M sorted value portfolios in Table 6 with that of EBIT/EV sorted 
value portfolios in Table 10. The value portfolios generated with EBIT/EV1 and EBIT/EV3 have 
an average monthly return of 1.93% to 1.96% while the value portfolios generated with B/M1 and 
B/M3 have an average monthly return of 2.08% to 2.12%.  
Figure 12. Cumulative performance comparison chart of EBIT/EV sorted value portfolio and B/M sorted value 
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Figure 13.  Cumulative Performance comparative Chart of Value and Growth portfolio with a base value of 100 ( Jan 
2017 to October 2017) 
 









Sharp ratio Sortino ratio 
EBIT/EV1_Value 1.96% 10.17% 45% 49% 0.17 0.25 
EBIT/EV2_Value 2.12% 10.95% 47% 56% 0.17 0.28 
EBIT/EV3_Value 1.93% 10.15% 45% 50% 0.17 0.25 
EBIT/EV1_Growth 2.10% 11.10%  60% 0.17 0.26 
EBIT/EV2_Growth 2.26% 11.41%  57% 0.18 0.27 
EBIT/EV3_Growth 2.11% 11.30%  61% 0.17 0.26 
VPa’ -0.14%    
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Figure 13 compares the cumulative performance of EBIT/EV sorted value portfolio with 
the growth portfolio. The results imply opposite conclusion as the EBIT/EV sorted growth strategy 
outperforms the value strategy in the long run. The examination of the monthly return also arrives 
at the same conclusion. As shown in Table 10, the average monthly value premium generated by 
EBIT/EV sorts (VPa’ and VPb’) indicates negative values. The comparable Sharp ratio and Sortino 
ratio derived by both portfolios suggests similar risk-adjusted performance. Therefore, the 
EBIT/EV metric fails to separate the value stocks from the growth one and doesn’t have significant 
value effect. My research shows contrary result to Gary and Carlisle's (2013) finding on the U.S. 
stock market, where EBIT/EV turns out to be a superior metric in deciding value stocks by 






This paper compares the performance of value and growth strategy based on stocks listed 
on Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange in the post-reform period after 2007. 2007 is an 
important turning point of the Chinese stock market as a series of regulation changes and 
accounting standards adjustment has been carried out to liberate market and improve the regulatory 
infrastructure.  Therefore, I select the post-reform period from January 2007 to October 2017, 
which is more representative of the present market condition, as the sample in this paper. The decile 
portfolios are formed based on their B/M ratios as well as EBIT/EV ratios. Each decile portfolio is 
equally weighted and rebalanced annually. 
Following the prior literature, I find weak value premium in the last 11 years with the B/M 
sorts. On average, the top B/M sorted portfolio (value) outperforms, the bottom B/M portfolio 
(growth) 0.44% to 0.45% monthly. Solely based on the cumulative return from January 2007 to 
October 2017, the value portfolio generates a better result. Assuming an initial investment of 100 
RMB, the value strategy generates a cumulative value of 773 RMB while the grow strategy only 
generates a cumulative value of 438 RMB. However, the rolling window analysis indicates that the 
value premium is not robust across different time frame and window size. Even though investors 
stick to the value strategy up to 8 years, there is about 50% chance that the value strategy 
underperforms the growth portfolio as one shift the investment window. However, comparing to 
the U.S. counterpart during the same time frame, as one increases the investment horizon, the 
probability of outperformance of the value portfolio is greatly improved. This might due to the 
limited number of samples as there is only 129 months sample available in the post-reform period. 
Another possible reason for the lack of long-run advantage of the value strategy in the A-share 
market could be the result of a large number of speculative investors. As short-term speculation 
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plays an important role in shaping the prices of the Chinese A-share stocks, the effect of value 
factor is greatly undermined. Speculative investors trade stocks for short-term gains regardless the 
fundamental value of the company. The value strategy which works in the U.S. market in a long-
term seems to fail in the A-share market due to the disruptive forces of market speculation.   
.  Though failing to detect the robustness of the value strategy from the sample period chosen 
in this paper, it serves as an important implication to monitor the value effect on the A-share market 
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Appendix 1. Past literature about factor studies in the Chinese A-share market 
Authors  Title  Time horizon  Sample  Main conclusion 
Meng & Ju 
(2013) 
Explanatory power of three-
factor model on A-share 
market of Shanghai Exchange 
in China 
July 2005 to 
June 2012  
 
SSE (CSMAR) The SMB(size factor) coefficient is significant but the 
explanatory power of the HML(value factor) is not very 
strong. 
Xu & Zhang 
(2014) 
The Fama-French Three 
Factors in the Chinese Stock 
Market 
July 1996 to 
June 2013 
SSE and SZE 
(CSMAR) 
The three Factors model explain 93% of the variation of A 
share return. SMB factors are all significant at 5% level and 
HML factors are significant at 5% except for three portfolios.  
Liu & Ping 
(2013) 
Model selection and 
relationship between 
idiosyncratic volatility and 
expected stock returns: 
evidence from Chinese A-
share Market 
January 2000 to 
March 2011 
 No robustly significant relationship exists between 
idiosyncratic volatility and expected return. Size, value, 
turnover, liquidity are positively correlated to the weighted 
return but momentum is negatively correlated. 
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Gan, Hu, Liu, & 
Li (2013) 
An Empirical Cross-Section 
Analysis of Stock Returns on 
the Chinese A-Share Stock 
Market 
January 1996 to 
December 2005 
SSE and SZE 
(CSMAR) 
“Significant statistical evidence was found for the presence of 
firm size and BTM ratio (134).”  
Lin, Wang, & 
Cai (2012) 
Are the Fama-French factors 
good proxies for latent risk 
factors? Evidence from the 
data of SHSE in China 
July 2000 to 
December 2009 
237 SSE stocks  
（CSMAR） 
“SMB and HML are poor proxies for the latent factors in the 





Firm Size, Book-to-Market 
Equity, and Security Returns: 







“Small and growth firms generate superior returns than big 
and value firms…the value effect is not as pervasive as was 
found for the US portfolios and other international markets 
(135).”  
Chin & Chan 
(2017) 
An Analysis of Investment 
Strategies and Excess Returns 
in the China (Shanghai) Stock 
Market 





A long/short strategy on B/M ratio generates excess monthly 
returns of 0.41%  while size strategy generates excess 
monthly return of 0.32%. Momentum works for buy-and-
hold-one-month return. Though liquidity generate excess 







Risk and return in the Chinese 
stock market: Does equity 
return dispersion proxy risk? 
July 1996 to  
June 2011 
SSE and SZE (Taiwan 
Economic Journal) 
a)The size and book-to-market factors are not as prevalent in 
the Chinese stock as in the case of the U.S. market. The results 
are mixed among different portfolio sort. 
b) Small and low-idiosyncratic volatility firms generate 
superior returns compared to big and high-idiosyncratic-
volatility firms but the effect is not significant.  
c) There exists a significant and positive return dispersion 
effect after market, size, book-to-market and idiosyncratic 
volatility are controlled. 
Q. Liu (2016) Corporate China 2.0: The 
Great Shakeup 
May 1998 to 
December 2012  
 There is a significantly positive correlation between these 
stock return and ROIC in the Chinese A-share market (p.66).” 
Shao (2017) The Comparison of Fama-
French Five-Factor Model in 
Chinese A-share Stock Market 
and in Real Estate Sector 
July 2002 to 
December 2015 
SSE and SZE 
(Datastream) 
“92% of the size B/M portfolios in the Chinese A-share 
market with low B/M ratio have higher return…..only two 
B/M ratio portfolios follow a pattern that the smaller size 
brings the higher return…Size effect does exist but is not very 




Song, Gao, & 
Qiao (2017) 
The Application in the 
Portfolio of China's A-share 
Market with Fama-French 
Five-Factor Model and the 
Robust Median Covariance 
Matrix 
January 2008 to 
December 2008; 
July 2013 to 
June 2014; July 
2014 to June 
2015 
SSE and SZE  “ The performance of the portfolio constructed by Fama-
French three-factor model is stronger than that of the Fama-
French five-factor model in depressed market sentiment.” 
Xie & Qu (2016) The Three-Factor Model and 
Size and Value Premiums in 
China ’ s Stock Market 
January 2005 to 
December 2012 
SSE (CSMAR) a) Three-factor model shows better explanatory power 
than CAPM(R2=79.83%) 
b) Both size premium and value premium exists  






market and the cross-section of 
returns for Chinese shares 
January 1996 to 
December 2012 
SSE and SZE 
(Datastream) 
a) Decomposition of B/M ratio provides more 
explanatory power than single B/M ratio. The 
increase of explanatory power is mainly from 
change of book equity value 
b) Net share issue and momentum are not significant   
Guo, Zhang, 
Zhang, & Zhang 
(2017) 
The five-factor asset pricing 
model tests for the Chinese 
stock market 
July 1995 to 
June 2014 
SSE and SZE 
(CSMAR) 
There are strong size and value patterns in average returns of 
Chinese stock market. The significance of HML is weakened 
by omitting the data of early years. 
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Hu et al.  (2015) Concept drift mining of 
portfolio selection factors in 
stock market 
July 1999 to 
June 2012 
SSE and SZE 
(CSMAR) 
The reversion of value premium exists. Stocks with higher 
B/P has lower average return 
B. Li, Boo, Ee, 
& Chen (2013) 
A re-examination of firm's 
attributes and share returns: 




SSE and SZE 
(CSMAR) 
Eminent presence of the value effect is found in the Chinese 
A-share market. ROA and cash-flow-to-price also have 
explanatory power over share returns. 
Wu (2016) The Asymmetric Momentum 
Effect in the Chinese Class A 
Share Market Amid Market 
Swings 
January 1996 to 
December 2010 
SSE and SZE 
(CSMAR) 
“On average, short-to-medium time horizon post-up-market 
momentum trading strategies outperformed post-down-
market momentum.(128).” 
Lam & Chan 
(2013) 
Liquidity and Stock Returns: 
China Evidence Liquidity and 
Stock Returns: China Evidence 
July 1994 to 
June 2012 
SSE and SZE 
(CSMAR) 
Fama-French five-factors all have different levels of 
explanatory power on the variations of the mean excess 
return. “MP, SMB, and HML are highly significant but the 
coefficients of LIQ and WML are relatively weaker in 
significance…. The evidence suggests that liquidity four-
factor model is the best model for the China stock markets 









T. Liu (2013) Risk and Return on Shanghai 
Stock Market 
2006 to 2010 SSE (Guangfa 
Security Company) 
The result indicates value premium and reverses size 
premium in the Shanghai stock market.  
Jiao & Lilti 
(2017) 
Whether profitability and 
investment factors have 
additional explanatory power 
comparing with Fama-French 
Three-Factor Model: empirical 
evidence on Chinese A-share 
stock market 
July 2010 to 
May 2015 
SSE and SZE （
Bloomberg） 
There always exists size effect that the excess returns are 
negatively related to firm size, and the value effect exists only 
in Size-B/P portfolios. 
Pan (2015) Common Risk Factors in 
China ’ s A Shares 
January 2008 to 
June 2015 
MSCI China A Share 
Index 
“Size factor plays a significant role, the value, price/earnings, 
and dividend yield factors play a fairly significant role (13).” 
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Exhibit 2.  Summary statistics of B/M and EBIT/EV ratios on each rebalancing date from 2007 to 2017  
 
 
 BM1  
 




  # Mean Max Min # Mean Max Min # Average Max Min 
2007 100 0.47 1.57 0.22 100 0.31 0.65 0.002 126 0.40 1.57 0.002 
2008 100 0.28 1.29 0.15 100 0.17 0.30 0.002 143 0.22 1.29 0.002 
2009 100 0.61 2.10 0.35 100 0.36 0.60 0.027 156 0.48 2.10 0.02 
2010 100 0.36 3.23 0.21 100 0.20 0.33 0.007 160 0.27 3.23 0.004 
2011 100 0.42 1.85 0.25 100 0.19 0.30 0.003 193 0.30 1.85 0.003 
2012 100 0.67 2.73 0.45 100 0.29 0.45 0.000 225 0.46 2.73 0.0002 
2013 100 0.68 2.31 0.47 100 0.28 0.43 0.003 247 0.45 2.31 0.002 
2014 100 0.76 4.49 0.46 100 0.25 0.44 0.001 247 0.46 4.49 0.0005 
2015 100 0.55 5.26 0.34 100 0.20 0.33 0.001 247 0.34 5.26 0.0003 
2016 100 0.65 20.45 0.37 100 0.21 0.36 0.002 270 0.37 20.45 0.001 
2017 100 0.54 2.28 0.34 100 0.20 0.32 0.000 302 0.31 2.28 0.0004 
Mean   0.52 4.32 0.29   0.24 0.41 0.00   0.39 4.32 0.01 
 EBIT/EV 1  
 




 # Mean Max Min # Mean Max Min # Mean Max Min 
2007 100 4.89 75.19 0.22 100 4.79 22.14 0.21 102 4.89 75.19 0.21 
2008 100 2.75 17.99 0.63 100 2.10 4.52 0.10 124 2.52 15.27 0.12 
2009 100 6.75 136.41 1.64 100 3.42 7.38 0.04 144 5.52 109.20 0.06 
2010 100 3.54 45.84 1.10 100 1.72 3.70 0.03 152 2.80 23.31 0.04 
2011 100 4.64 78.37 1.63 100 1.79 3.73 0.05 172 3.46 78.37 0.07 
2012 100 7.12 53.28 3.19 100 2.31 4.58 0.06 208 4.89 52.90 0.07 
2013 100 6.59 64.47 3.20 100 1.90 3.97 0.05 232 4.32 38.66 0.05 
2014 100 6.86 237.50 2.69 100 1.62 3.22 0.07 240 4.36 229.23 0.08 
2015 100 5.55 262.36 2.43 100 1.49 3.06 0.17 238 3.62 33.30 0.18 
2016 100 3.93 26.54 1.61 100 0.90 1.89 0.11 256 2.47 23.65 0.12 
2017 1000 5.01 104.41 2.23 100 1.14 2.39 0.10 290 2.53 38.82 0.10 





















Distributon of market capitalization of sampled stocks  (million RMB)
